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PEACHES, SPEECH, AND CLARENCE THOMAS: 
YES, CALIFORNIA, THERE IS A JUSTICE WHO 
UNDERSTANDS THE RAMIFICATIONS OF 
CONTROLLING COMMERCIAL SPEECH 
Jennifer R. Franklin • 
When it comes time to interpret the Constitution's provisions, such as, 
for instance, the Speech or Press Clauses of the First Amendment, 
reasonable minds can certainly differ as to their exact meaning. But 
that does not mean that there is no right or correct answer; that there 
are no clear, eternal principles recognized and put into motion by our 
founding documents. This was the mistake of the legal realists, and it 
continues to be the mistake of the critical theorists: law is something 
more than merely the preferences of the power elites writ large. The 
law is a distinct, independent discipline, with certain principles and 
modes of analysis that yield what we can discern to be correct and 
incorrect answers to certain problems. I 
In April 1996, Justice Clarence Thomas of the United States 
Supreme Court spoke at the University of Kansas School of Law as part 
of the Stephensen Lectures in Law & Government Series.2 His address 
focused on his philosophy of judging. The above quote from Justice 
Thomas's speech, as well as a few that will follow, exemplifies how 
Justice Thomas's jurisprudence concerning Constitutional issues, 
including those surrounding commercial speech, has been built on the 
belief that a correct interpretation of the law exists. a This article focuses 
on Justice Thomas's short but pointed dissent in Glickman v. Wileman 
Bros. & Elliott, Inc., 4 and how it reflects his jurisprudence on commercial 
speech and the First Amendment. The dissent itself is straightforward 
and forms a framework to examine Justice Thomas's jurisprudence 
section by section. 
The first section of this article will address the majority opinion in 
Glickman and why the majority came to the conclusion that speech was 
not an issue. Second, Justice David Souter's dissenting opinion, with 
whom Chief Justice William Rehnquist and Justice Antonin Scalia 
Jennifer R. Franklin, B.S., Virginia Polytechnic Institute & State University, 
1988; J.D., summa cum laude, Regent University School of Law, 1999; Judicial Clerk, 
Alabama Supreme Court, Montgomery, Alabama. 
t Hon. Justice Clarence Thomas, Judging, 45 U. KAN. L. REV. 1, 5-6 (1996) (This is 
an excerpt from a speech given by Justice Thomas at the University of Kansas School of 
Law on Apr. 8, 1996). 
2 See id. 
See id. 
521 u.s. 457, 504 (1997). 
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joined, will be examined because Justice Thomas joined it except for part 
II, to which he strongly objected. Third, the remainder of the article will 
focus on Justice Thomas's commercial speech jurisprudence against the 
backdrop of his separate dissenting opinion. The quotes from Justice 
Thomas's speech provide an understanding about the strength of his 
convictions. 
I. WHY THE MAJORITY SAYS THAT SPEECH IS SPEECH 
EXCEPT WHEN IT IS NOT 
On June 25, 1997, the Supreme Court upheld a Federal marketing 
program that forces agricultural producers to pay for generic fruit 
advertising. 5 In doing so, the majority rejected the lower court's holding 
that this requirement was tantamount to compelled speech and thus 
violated the First Amendment.s The majority emphasized that simply 
because "an economic regulation may indirectly lead to a reduction in a 
handler's individual advertising budget does not itself amount to a 
restriction on speech."7 
The case in question, Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliott, Inc.,s 
was brought by Wileman Bros. and other fruit producers in California to 
challenge regulations and requirements under the Agricultural 
Marketing Agreement Act of 1937 (AMAA).9 Wileman Bros.' claim 
included a First Amendment challenge to the requirement that fruit 
growers in the area subsidize generic advertising. 10 The regulations 
challenged were Marketing Orders 916 and 917 that regulate nectarines, 
peaches, pears and plums in California. 11 Amendments to both of these 
orders over the years have authorized generic advertising of each of 
these fruits.I2 Wileman Brothers & Elliott, Inc. is a large fruit producer 
in California,I3 In 1987 and 1988, Wileman Brothers had problems with 
the maturity and minimum size requirements of some of their fruit 
varieties and refused to pay the assessments, subsequently filing a 
challenge of the order's standards.I4 In 1988, the fruit producers filed a 
See Linda Greenhouse, Agricultural Marketing Effort is Ruled Co118titutional, 
N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 1997, at D25. 
6 See id. 
Glickman, 521 U.S. at 470. 
ld. at 460. 
"Congress enacted the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937 (AMAA), 
ch. 296, 50 Stat. 246, as amended, 7 U.S.C. § 601 et seq., in order to establish and maintain 
orderly marketing conditions and fair prices for agricultural commodities." ld. at 461 
(citation omitted). 
1o See id. at 462-63. 
n See id. at 463. 
12 See id. 
13 See id. 
14 See id. 
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second petition including a challenge to the generic advertising 
regulations claiming that it violated their First Amendment right to free 
speech because it compelled them to render financial aid to support 
commercial speech to which they objected.15 The United States Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit rejected the fruit producers' statutory 
claims but upheld their First Amendment claim and found that the 
generic advertising regulations violated the First Amendment.16 
Specifically, the court found that the right to freedom of speech, as 
protected by the First Amendment, includes the right not to be 
compelled to pay for others' speech.17 The court also applied "the test for 
restrictions on commercial speech set out in Central Hudson Gas & 
Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission of New York."1B 
The Central Hudson test is a 
four-part test to determine the constitutionality of commercial speech 
regulation: (1) was the speech false or misleading ([i]f so, it could 
constitutionally be regulated); (2) does the government regulation 
further a substantial interest; (3) does the regulation directly advance 
that interest; and (4) could the governmental interest be equally 
served ''by a more limited restriction on commercial speech[?]."l9 
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, applying this test, held that the 
regulations violated the First Amendment.2o The court held that the 
speech was neither misleading nor untruthful, and that the government 
did have substantial interests in regulating the market and increasing 
returns to the fruit producers.21 The government's interests were to 
increase demand for the various fruits and, by spreading the cost of 
advertising among all of the fruit producers, also to increase the profit 
margin.z2 However, the Court of Appeals further held that the 
government's actions failed the second prong of the Central Hudson test 
because it could not prove that forced generic advertising was more 
effective than individual advertising to meet that goal.23 Finally, the 
court held that the government's program was not sufficiently "narrowly 
tailored" under the fourth prong of the test. 24 
1s See id. at 463-66. 
1s See id. at 465-67. 
11 See id. at 466. 
1s /d. (quoting Wileman Bros. & Elliot, Inc. v. Espy, 58 F.3d 1367, 1378 (9th Cir. 
1995), referring to Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n., 447 U.S. 557 
(1980)). 
19 Martin H. Redish, First Amendment Theory and the Demise of the Commercial 
Speech Distinction: The Case of the Smoking Controversy, 24 N. KY. L. REV. 553, 559 (1997) 
(citing and quoting in part Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 563-64). 
20 See Glickman, 521 U.S. at 465. 
21 See id. at 466. 
22 See id. at 464-66. 
23 See id. 
24 See id. 
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In reviewing the case, the Supreme Court never reached the validity 
of the analyf?is employed by the Court of Appeals.25 The issue, as 
articulated by Justice Stevens, was "whether being compelled to fund 
this advertising raises a First Amendment issue for us to resolve, or 
rather is simply a question of economic policy for Congress and the 
Executive to resolve."26 According to Justice Stevens, speech restraints 
must reach one of three levels to be viewed under the higher scrutiny 
standard attached to First Amendment issues: First, they must impose 
"restraint on the freedom of any producer to communicate any message 
to any audience[;]" or second, they must "compel any person to engage in 
any actual or symbolic speech[;]" or third they must compel a person to 
endorse or fund political or ideological views.27 Justice Stevens wrote 
that the restraints must be viewed under the same standard as all 
"anticompetitive features of the marketing orders" if none of these levels 
are implicated.2s 
The Supreme Court rejected the producers' argument that the 
government had essentially deprived them of the opportunity to finance 
their own advertisements by forcing them to subsidize generic 
advertisements, thereby restricting their ability to "communicate any 
message to any audience."29 According to Justice Stevens, "[T]he First 
Amendment has never been construed to require heightened scrutiny of 
any financial burden that has the incidental effect of constraining the 
size of a firm's advertising budget."30 
The Supreme Court also rejected the argument that the subsidy 
assessment~ compelled speech as it had previously been defined. The 
producers were not required to repeat "objectionable message[s] out of 
their own mouths; use their own property to convey an antagonistic 
ideological message; ... respond ... when they 'would prefer to remain 
silent;"' or publicly identify themselves as associated with the message.31 
Justice Stevens pointed out that while the First Amendment prohibits 
the compulsion of anyone to render financial support for others' speech, 
the appellate court misread the Court's holding in Abood.32 Abood 
recognizes the right not to be forced to fund "an organization whose 
25 See id. at 468. 
26 /d. 
27 /d. at 469-70 (footnotes omitted). 
2s /d. at 470. 
29 Id. at 469. 
30 !d. at 470. 
31 /d. at 471 (citing West Virginia Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943); 
Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977); Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n of 
Cal., 475 U.S. 1, 18 (1986) (plurality opinion); and Prune Yard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 
u.s. 74 (1980)). 
32 See Glickman, 521 U.S. at 471 (citing Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 
209, 235 (1977)). 
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expressive activities conflict with one's 'freedom of belief."'33 According to 
Stevens and the majority opinion, the subsidy assessments did not rise 
to those levels because they did not interfere with "the notion that an 
individual should be free to believe as he will, and that in a free society 
one's beliefs should be shaped by his mind and his conscience rather 
than coerced by the State."34 In the Court's opinion, Stevens wrote, 
[R]equiring [producers] to pay the assessments cannot be said to 
engender any crisis of conscience. None of the advertising in this 
record promotes any particular message other than encouraging 
consumers to buy California tree fruit. Neither the fact that 
[producers] may prefer to foster that message independently in order 
to promote and distinguish their own products, nor the fact that they 
think more or less money should be spent fostering it, makes this case 
comparable to those in which an objection rested on political or 
ideological disagreement with the content of the message.as 
Justice Stevens concluded by pointing out that a majority of 
producers in the area had to approve the advertising and that these 
decisions, acceptable for other regulatory programs, should be no less 
acceptable for promotional advertising.36 The promotional advertising 
programs, dubbed a "species of economic regulation," should "enjoy the 
same strong presumption of validity that we accord to other policy 
judgments made by Congress."37 The dissatisfaction with the program by 
"one or more producers . . . is not a sufficient reason for overriding the 
judgment of the majority of market participants, bureaucrats, and 
legislators who have concluded that such programs are beneficial."38 
Therefore, the producers' suit was summarily dismissed and the Court 
ruled in favor of the government.a9 
II. WHY JUSTICE SOUTER PARTED COMPANY WITH THE COURT 
Justice Souter dissented from the majority because it decided that 
there was "no First Amendment right to be free of coerced subsidization 
of commercial speech."4o Justice Souter wrote early in his dissenting 
opinion that the "very reasons for recognizing that commercial speech 
falls within the scope of First Amendment protection" should also afford 
protection against being compelled to subsidize speech as well. 41 He 
33 Id. 
34 Id. at 472 (quoting Abood, 431 U.S. at 234-35) (internal quotations omitted). 
35 Id. at 472. 
36 See id. at 476. 
37 Id. at 477. 
3s Id. 
39 See id. 
•o Id. 
41 Id. at 477-78. 
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believed that the Court should have examined the coerced payments 
under the same scrutiny used to examine restrictions on commercial 
speech.42 
While Justice Souter agreed with the majority that a proper 
understanding of its holding in Abood was necessary to review this case, 
he pointed to two more fundamental basics from which the Court should 
start in any speech analysis. 43 The first basic principle of First 
Amendment law is that speech should be allowed some form of 
protection unless it is part of a category beyond the scope of the First 
Amendment.44 Second, speech subject to this protection may not become 
either "the subject of coercion to speak or coercion to subsidize speech."45 
Justice Souter explained that fundamentally, the Court has always 
recognized that "[a]ll ideas having even the slightest redeeming social 
importance ... have the full protection of the guaranties" of the First 
Amendment. 46 In Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens 
Consumer Council, Inc., 47 the Supreme Court addressed the issue of 
commercial speech and determined that truthful, non-misleading 
commercial speech should be granted the same protection as non-
commercial speech.4B Not only should it be granted protection, but it 
deserves protection because the claim that commercial speech is socially 
unimportant fails when the court weighs the interest a consumer has in 
obtaining information with the value of economically promoting one's 
"wares."49 Commercial speech in its persuasive nature yields a power to 
inform, and the link between commercial speech and the resulting 
commercial transactions greatly increases the importance of its message 
to those involved. so Souter pointed out that if the First Amendment 
protects commercial speech from suppression, it should also provide 
compelled commercial speech the same level of suspicion and scrutiny. 51 
Justice Souter cited cases that have recognized that First Amendment 
guarantees include "decision[s] of both what to say and what not to 
say."52 Souter accused the majority of drawing the wrong conclusions 
42 See id. at 478. 
•a See id. 
4
• See id. (False or misleading advertisements and illegal speech are all beyond the 
scope of the First Amendment). 
45 !d. 
46 !d. at 478-79 (quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957)) (internal 
quotations omitted). 
47 425 u.s. 748 (1976). 
48 See Glickman, 521 U.S. at 479. 
49 !d. 
so See id. at 479-80. 
51 See id. at 480-81. 
52 I d. at 481 (quoting Riley v. National Fed'n of the Blind, Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 796-97 
(1988), and citing Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group, Inc., 515 
HeinOnline  -- 12 Regent U. L. Rev. 633 1999-2000
2000) PEACHES, SPEECH, AND CLARENCE THOMAS 633 
from Abood. 53 The majority held that Abood stood for limits on compelled 
financing of speech only where the speech is ideological, political, or "not 
germane to an otherwise lawful regulatory program."54 Justice Souter 
pointed out that later decisions, such as Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass'n,ss 
have clarified the holding in Abood56 and shown that in order for a 
mandatory fee to survive analysis it "must not only be germane to some 
otherwise legitimate regulatory scheme; it must also be justified by vital 
policy interests of the government and not add significantly to the 
burdening of free speech inherent in achieving those interests."57 
Justice Souter then analogized the compelled fruit advertising to 
the Court's treatment of compelled public relations effort espousing the 
virtues of teachers in Lehnert. 58 Just as teachers cannot be compelled to 
fund generic advertisements intended to increase the public's image of 
teachers, fruit producers should not be compelled to fund generic 
advertisements that are intended to increase the public's demand for 
fruit. 59 Having a legitimate interest in regulating the market for fruit or 
increasing the public's perception of teachers does not mean that the 
most narrowly tailored means to accomplish these ideals is to advertise 
the virtues of either fruit or teaching. so If the First Amendment rights of 
teachers protect them from having to subsidize public relations efforts 
that are generically focused on promoting teachers, then the rights of 
fruit producers should be similarly protected.61 Because Congress has 
been able to regulate the agricultural industry with no advertising 
schemes in the past, Congress should be able to continue such regulation 
without forcing the fruit producers to fund advertisements with which 
they do not agree.62 In comparing the fruit producers to the teachers in 
Lehnert, Justice Souter wrote, "In each instance, the challenged burden 
on dissenters' First Amendment rights is substantially greater than 
anything inherent in regulation of the commercial transactions."63 
U.S. 557 (1995); Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977); West Virginia Bd. of Ed. v. 
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943)). 
53 See id. at 483·84. 
54 Id. at 483. 
55 500 u.s. 507 (1991). 
56 See Glickman, 521 U.S. at 485. 
57 ld. (citing Lehnert, 500 U.S. at 519) (emphasis added). 
sa See id. at 485. In Lehnert, the Court held "that a teachers' union could not 
constitutionally charge objecting employees for a public relations campaign meant to raise 
the esteem for teachers in the public mind and so increase the public's willingness to pay 
for public education." ld. at 485 (citations omitted). 
59 See id. 
60 See id. 
61 See id. 
62 See id. 
63 ld. at 486. 
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The second reason that Justice Souter dissented from the majority 
is the majority's proposition that compelled subsidization is proper when 
the speech is not political or ideological.64 Souter asserted that the 
majority erred when it failed to recognize that producers still may 
"disagree" with the generic ads even if the speech was neither political 
nor ideological.G5 The producers did not agree with the portion of the ads 
that suggested that all fruit is equal.GG Each producer believed that his 
fruit warranted "more particular claims about the merits of their own 
brands."67 Justice Souter argued that compelled funding deserves the 
same level of scrutiny (which in his opinion means the application of the 
Central Hudson test) afforded restrictions on commercial speech or at 
very least to the same analysis used to test the compulsion of non-
commercial speech. ss 
Justice Souter's scrutiny of the orders requiring subsidies by the 
producers followed the same Central Hudson test that the lower court 
used. Under the analysis, Justice Souter concluded that the Secretary of 
Agriculture failed to meet three of the four prongs of the Central Hudson 
test because the government's interest was not "substantial," the 
regulations did not necessarily advance the government's interest, nor 
did the government sufficiently narrowly tailor the regulations.69 Justice 
Souter undertook a lengthy and detailed analysis of each prong of the 
Central Hudson test in reaching his conclusion. However, Souter's use of 
the Central Hudson test is where he and Justice Thomas part company 
and his analysis of the test reaches a similar conclusion as the appellate 
court.70 Therefore, that analysis will not be discussed in this article. 
III. JUSTICE THOMAS'S VERY SHORT DISSENT 
This dissent is one of the shortest opinions that Justice Thomas has 
written in his tenure on the Supreme Court. Yet, in this very short 
space, he succinctly makes his point. His dissent makes two statements. 
First, while he agrees with part one of Justice Souter's dissent, he 
sharply disagrees with part two and the use of the Central Hudson 
Test. 71 Second, he is alarmed with the majority's conclusion that this 
case does not raise a First Amendment Issue. 72 
64 See id. at 487. 
ss See id. at 488. 
66 See id. 
67 ld. at 489. 
68 See id. at 489·90. 
69 See id. at 491-92. 
10 See id. at 504. 
71 See id. 
72 See id. 
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This section of the article examines Justice Thomas's statements in 
his dissent. First, the article focuses on Justice Thomas's express 
opinions on commercial speech and the First Amendment. Second, the 
article demonstrates Justice Thomas's jurisprudence through his 
opinions and the cases he relied on for support. 
A. I join Justice Souter's dissent, with the exception of Part IL My join is 
thus limited because I continue to disagree with the use of the Central 
Hudson balancing test and the discounted weight given to commercial 
speech generally. Because the regulation at issue here fails even the more 
lenient Central Hudson test, however, it, a fortiori, would fail the higher 
standard that should be applied to all speech, whether commercial or 
not.13 
In April 1996, Justice Clarence Thomas of the United States 
Supreme Court spoke at the University of Kan·sas School of Law as part 
of the Stephensen Lectures in Law & Government Series. 74 His address 
focused on his philosophy of judging. This excerpt, as well as a few that 
will follow, build a foundation for his jurisprudence concerning 
Constitutional issues, including those surrounding commercial speech. 75 
Justice Thomas, in his speech, talked about the use of balancing tests by 
the Supreme Court: 
It is always tempting to adopt balancing tests or to rest one's decision 
on the presence or absence of various factors. Judges can then say that 
they decided the case on its facts, thereby preserving some degree of 
flexibility for future cases. While this may be appropriate for trial 
courts, or for state courts, it is not always the best approach for the 
Supreme Court or an appellate court. Whenever possible, the Court 
and judges generally should adopt clear, bright-line rules that, as I 
like to say to my clerks, you can explain to the gas station attendant 
as easily as you can explain to a law professor. Rules not only provide 
private parties with notice, they also limit judicial discretion by 
narrowing the ability of judges in the future to alter the law to fit their 
policy preferences. If the Court holds broadly today, for example, that 
all anonymous leafleting is to be given Firsi Amendment protection, 
then a future Court will not have wiggle room to reverse course to 
remove that protection for leaflets that turn out to be written by an 
unpopular group, like the Nazis. Broader rules are more likely to be 
impartial in their impact on and application to specific parties. Thus, 
73 Jd. at 504 (emphasis added and citations omitted) Justice Thomas's dissent, in 
full , will be used for point headings in this section of the article. 
74 See Thomas, supra note 1. 
75 See id. 
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clear rules-along with life tenure and an irreducible salary-
encourage judges to maintain their impartiality.76 
In 1980, the Court adopted the four part Central Hudson balancing 
test that was used by the appellate court and by Justice Souter.77 The 
adoption of this test rather than the application of traditional tests was 
based on the "'common sense' distinction between speech proposing a 
commercial transaction, which occurs in an area traditionally subject to. 
government regulation, and other varieties of speech."7B The Court held 
that while commercial speech that is neither misleading nor related to 
unlawful activities is protected by the Constitution, other forms of 
expression are afforded greater protection.79 Also, protection for 
commercial speech from governmental regulation depends on the nature 
of the speech and the nature of the governmental interests served by 
that regulation.so Limited protection for commercial speech does not 
apply to speech that is more likely to deceive than inform the consumer. 
Therefore, the limited protection circumscribes only the government's 
power to regulate speech that "is neither misleading nor related to 
unlawful activity."B1 This need to evaluate the limitations on the power 
of the government to regulate lawful, informative speech led to the 
adoption of the Central Hudson test.s2 
Thomas, writing for the majority in Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co.,sa 
faithfully applied the Central Hudson test in determining that 
restrictions prohibiting alcohol levels to be displayed on beer bottles 
violated the First Amendment.B4 In that case, Justice Stevens concurred 
in the judgment but held that the Central Hudson test should have been 
inapplicable because the government sought neither to regulate 
misleading speech nor to protect consumers from incomplete or 
inaccurate information.ss Justice Stevens questioned the rationale 
behind the Central Hudson test by suggesting that the test itself "is not 
related to the reasons for allowing more regulation of commercial speech 
than other speech."Bs Yet, at that time, Justice Thomas held firmly to the 
Central Hudson test.B7 
76 Id. at 7. 
77 447 u.s. 557 (1980). 
78 ld. at 562 (quoting Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 455-56 {1978) 
(internal quotes omitted)). 
79 See id. at 563. 
so See id. 
81 ld. at 564. 
82 See id. 
83 514 u.s. 476 (1995). 
a. See id. 
as See id. at 492. 
86 ld. at 493. 
87 See id. at 491. 
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Just slightly over a year later, however, Justice Stevens delivered 
the opinion of the Court and applied the Central Hudson test in 44 
Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island.BB Justice Thomas concurred in the 
judgment but denounced the use of the test.s9 44 Liquormart concerned a 
ban on the use of prices in liquor advertisements in a state effort to 
temper the use of alcohol.90 Justice Stevens recognized that the main 
reason commercial speech is more susceptible to government regulation 
is because the state has a vested interest in protecting consumers from 
"commercial harms."91 Therefore, when a ban targets speech that is not 
misleading it can be presumed that the underlying reason is a 
government fear not that the public will be misled or deceived but "that 
the public will respond 'irrationally' to the truth."92 On this basis, Justice 
Stevens determined that Rhode Island's ban on truthful, non-misleading 
information required evaluation under the strict Central Hudson 
analysis.93 Mter applying the analysis, the Court held that Rhode Island 
failed to meet the burden required by the Central Hudson test: that a 
complete ban on advertising was justified to meet a compelling interest 
and that it also advanced that interest to a material degree.94 In this 
case, Rhode Island was not justified in placing a complete ban on liquor 
price advertisements in an effort to promote temperance. Further, there 
was no satisfactory proof to show that such a ban was successful in 
promoting temperance through decreased liquor sales.95 
Justice Thomas's concurrence began with a bold, straightforward 
statement: 
In cases such as this, in which the government's asserted interest is to 
keep legal users of a product or service ignorant in order to 
manipulate their choices in the marketplace, the balancing test 
adopted in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service 
Commission of New York,96 should not be applied, in my view. Rather, 
such an "interest is per se illegitimate and can no more justify 
regulation of commercial speech than it can justify regulation of non-
commercial speech. 97 
Rhode Island's stated interest was to promote temperance, an act they 
purported to achieve through eliminating "sale" prices in ads, which 
88 517 u.s. 484 (1996). 
s9 See id. at 518. 
so See id. at 490. 
91 ld. at 502. See Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 426 (1993). 
92 ld. See Linmark Assoc., Inc. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 96 (1977). 
93 See id. at 508. 
9
• See id. 
95 See id. 
96 447 u.s. 557 (1980). 
97 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 518 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in 
judgment). 
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would result in an increase in noncompetitive retail price levels.98 
Justice Thomas explained that this type of regulation on the part of the 
states is paternalistic in nature and deprives consumers of the right to 
evaluate the information themselves and make informed choices.99 
Justice Thomas lauded the cases that have stressed the need to protect 
commercial speech and the importance of freely available consumer 
information after the Court first recognized the right to protection in 
Virginia Pharmacy .1oo 
On the other hand, Justice Thomas also recognized that there 
seemed to be a trend to allow the suppression of information if, in fact, 
the government can show that its regulations were successful.IOl This 
trend is based on the assumption that commercial "speech was in a 
'subordinate position in the scale of First Amendment values."'1o2 Justice 
Thomas wrote, "I do not see a philosophical or historical basis for 
asserting that 'commercial' speech is of 'lower value' than 
'noncommercial' speech. Indeed, some historical materials suggest to the 
contrary."l03 According to Thomas, the Court has never raised a valid 
explanation to justify restricting commercial speech that is neither 
misleading nor connected with illegal activities.l04 Therefore, Justice 
Thomas believes that applying the Central Hudson test to cases where 
the state's interest is to manipulate the marketplace by "keeping 
consumers ignorant" contradicts the "rationale for protecting 
'commercial' speech."1os 
98 See id. at 504. 
99 See id. at 519. 
100 See id. at 520. See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer 
Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976). Accord Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476 (1995); 
Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410 (1993); Zauderer v. Office of 
Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 637 (1985) (stating that "[t]here is no longer any room 
to doubt that what has come to be known as 'commercial speech' is entitled to the 
protection of the First Amendment, albeit to protection somewhat less extensive than that 
afforded 'noncommercial speech."'); Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 69 
(1983) (advertising of contraceptives protected because it "implicates 'substantial 
individual and societal interests' in the free flow of commercial information, but also 
relates to activity which is protected from unwarranted state interference."); Friedman v. 
Rogers, 440 U.S. 1 (1979) (recognizing that even a commercial advertisement is possible in 
generating public interest.); Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 351 (1977) (ruled that 
blanket advertising ban on attorneys would deprive consumers of "at least some of the 
relevant information needed for an informed decision"); Linmark Assoc. , Inc. v. Township 
of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85 (1977) (holding that a ban on "for sale" and "sold" real estate 
signs violated First Amendment because state was trying to prevent white homeowners 
from "irrationally" leaving the town). 
1o1 See 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 521 . 
102 ld. (quoting Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978)). 
103 ld. at 522. 
104 See id. at 523. 
105 ld. at 523-24. 
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Although a stricter application of the test would yield results 
consistent with Thomas's views, he would still adhere to the principle 
found in Virginia Pharmacy, "that all attempts to dissuade legal choices 
by citizens by keeping them ignorant are impermissible."106 According to 
Thomas, the test leads to the use of individual judicial preferences.l07 
These preferences, Thomas fears, simply become inserted for those 
preferences being exerted by the legislature when restrictions are 
originally placed on commercial speech.108 The Central Hudson test, 
according to Thomas, asks courts to determine if the legislature was 
correct in its assumption that its citizens cannot be trusted to determine 
for themselves, based upon the free flow of information, that 
consumption of a product is harmful enough to be avoided.l09 Justice 
Thomas would avoid the paternalism associated not only with the 
legislature's actions but also with the Central Hudson test by returning 
to the decision of Virginia Pharmacy. no 
B. I write separately to note my disagreement with the majority's conclusion 
that coerced funding of advertising does not involve "speech" at all and 
does not even raise a First Amendment "issue., It is one thing to differ 
about whether a particular regulation involves an "abridgment" of the 
freedom of speech, but it is entirely another matter~nd a complete 
repudiation of our precedent-for the majority to deny that "speech" is 
even at issue in this case.m 
In his opinion in Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co.,ll2 Justice Thomas 
traced the development of the recognition of commercial advertising as 
speech.ua Prior to Virginia Pharmacy,114 the Court's position was that 
paid advertising did not constitute protected speech under the First 
Amendment.115 The opinion in Virginia Pharmacy repudiated that 
position when the Court held that the "free flow of commercial 
information [was] 'indispensable to the proper allocation of resources in 
a free enterprise system."'us Since Virginia Pharmacy, the Court has 
106 Id. at 526. 
107 See id. at 527. 
108 See id. at 528. 
109 See id. 
110 See id. 
m Glickman u. Wileman Bros. & Elliot, Inc., 521 U.S. 457, 504 (1997) (emphasis 
added). 
112 514 u.s. 476 (1995). 
m See id. at 481-82. 
114 425 u.s. 748 (1976). 
11s See 514 U.S. at 481. 
116 ld. 
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recognized that payment for advertising constitutes commercial speech 
that is worthy of protection by the First Amendment.n7 
L "In numerous cases, this Court has recognized that paying money for the 
purposes of advertising involves speech."US 
In Justice Thomas's dissenting opinion, he relies on four cases for 
the proposition that the Court had "recognized that paying money for the 
purposes of advertising involves speech."U9 As early as 1976, the same 
year that Virginia Pharmacy was decided, the Court held that 
contributions and acts of expenditures were more than conduct, they 
were forms of speech.12o The Court recognized that some forms of 
communication, involving speech or conduct or both, are made possible 
by "the giving and spending of money."121 However, the Court has "never 
suggested that the dependence of a communication on the expenditure of 
money operates itself to introduce a nonspeech element or to reduce the 
exacting scrutiny required by the First Amendment."l22 The Court in 
Buckley v. Valeo held that individual contributions to campaigns could 
be limited.123 However, limiting expenditures, such as those for 
campaign advertising, was unconstitutional because it abridged the First 
Amendment's protection of such "speech."l24 
A year later, in Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, 125 the Court 
dealt with the use of union dues or service fees used to finance political 
or ideological advertising.l26 The fact that the issue was their payment 
for the "speech," and not the actual "speech" itself, did not deter the 
Court from finding that First Amendment issues were implicated.127 In 
First National Bank v. Bellotti, 12s the Court recognized the right of a 
corporation to use its resources to commercially fight a proposed 
constitutional amendment.l29 The Court rejected the theory that in order 
for commercial speech to be protected, it had to be pertinent to the 
corporation's business interests.130 The Court held that the implications 
m See 521 U.S. at 505. 
11s Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
119 ld. 
120 See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976). 
121 ld. at 16. 
122 /d. at 16·17 (citing Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 820 (1975)). 
123 See id. at 143. 
12• Id. 
125 431 u.s. 209 (1977). 
126 See id. at 234. 
127 See id. 
128 435 u.s. 765 (1978). 
129 See id. at 767. 
130 See id. at 783. 
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of the First Amendment are not limited solely to the expression of the 
individual but also to the free flow of information available to the 
public. 131 Commercial speech is protected because of the societal benefit 
it bestows as much as because of an individual's right to express 
himself.132 
Finally, in Central Hudson, the Court recognized that 
advertisements promoting the use of electricity qualified as speech under 
the First Amendment.taa The Court defined commercial speech as 
"expression related solely to the economic interests of the speaker and its 
audience."l34 The state had a legitimate interest, due to an energy 
shortage, in discouraging the use of electricity.tas The Court maintained 
that its acceptance of First Amendment protection was to reject the view 
that the government has the "complete power" to regulate this type of 
commercial speech.tas Because of the high cost of mass media, from the 
distribution of pamphlets to the production of television commercials, 
virtually all forms of commercial speech must be monetarily financed.t37 
The Supreme Court's decisions since 1976 have consistently held that 
monetary support of commercial advertising involves protected speech. 
2. "The Court also has recognized that compelling speech raises a First 
Amendment issue just as much as restricting speech."138 
Justice Thomas cited several cases that outline the history of the 
Court's recognition that compelled speech is a First Amendment issue.139 
The Supreme Court addressed the problem of compelled speech within 
the context of the First Amendment in West Virginia State Board of 
Education u. Barnette.140 In that case, the Court decided that compelling 
elementary school children to salute the flag was unconstitutional. 141 
The Court defined the issue not as whether the ideology being expressed 
was good or bad, nor whether the noncompliance with the mandate to 
salute was for religious reasons, but whether the First Amendment 
protected the children's right not to salute.142 The Court held that the 
131 See id. 
132 See id. 
133 447 u.s. 557 (1980). 
1:U ld. at 561. 
135 See id. 
136 See id. at 562. 
131 See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 19. 
138 Glickman, 521 U.S. at 505. 
139 See id. at 505 n .2. 
140 319 u.s. 624 (1943). 
141 See id. at 642. 
142 See id. at 641-42. 
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First Amendment protected against compelled speech as strongly as it 
protected against suppressed speech.143 
In 1974, the Court in Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillot44 
again addressed the issue of compelled speech when a Florida newspaper 
refused to print replies by a candidate for office after the newspaper had 
critically cited him in its editorials.t4s The candidate then sued the paper 
under a statute that required newspapers to provide an opportunity for 
candidates to reply to unfavorable press. 146 The Supreme Court held that 
the statute was unconstitutional because compelling a newspaper to 
print what it believes is against "reason" to print is a violation of the 
protections afforded the press un9er the First Amendment. 147 The Court 
noted that even if the Florida statute did not create any added burden 
upon the newspapers, it still failed the test under the First Amendment 
because it intruded upon the choice of what to publish, how much to 
publish, which ideas to publish, and all other essential elements of the 
editorial function.148 
In 1977, the Court addressed the issue of compelled speech when it 
held that the state of New Hampshire could not compel its citizens to 
display the state motto, "Live Free or Die," on license plates.149 The 
defendants were prosecuted for violating a statute by covering up the 
words on their license plate.150 The Court held that the statute in 
question compelled its citizens to "use their private property as a 'mobile 
billboard' for the State's ideological message or suffer a penalty ... . "151 
Because the First Amendment protects individuals' rights to their own 
ideologies and points of view, it also protected their right not to support 
a view to which they objected.1s2 
In Pacific Gas and Electric Co. v. Public Utilities Commission,153 the 
Supreme Court held that a gas company could not be compelled to 
include a third party's literature in the company's billings to 
customers.t54 For 62 years, the gas company distributed a monthly 
newsletter of its own.tss However, when a group objected to that practice, 
the commission found that the space in the envelopes left over after all 
143 See id. at 642. 
144 418 u.s. 241 (1974). 
145 See id. at 243; 
146 See id. at 244. 
1n See id. at 256. 
148 See id. at 258. 
1•s See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U .S. 705 (1977). 
150 See id. at 708. 
151 ld. at 715. 
152 See id. at 715. 
153 475 u.s. 1 (1986). 
154 See id. at 20·21. 
155 See id. at 5. 
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necessary materials were included belonged, not to the gas company, but 
to the "rate payers."156 The commission then ordered the gas company to 
include newsletters published by a third party four times a year, only 
allowing the gas company to distribute its own newsletter if there was 
enough space left or if they added postage. 157 The gas company objected 
to being forced to distribute literature that contradicted its beliefs.1sa 
The Supreme Court held first that the company's own newsletter 
was protected speech under the First Amendment and not subject to 
suppression.159 Second, the Court held that compelling the gas company 
to include the newsletters of a group whose views were in opposition to 
those of the gas company infringed upon the company's rights under the 
First Amendment.160 This type of compelled speech would force the gas 
company to either appear to agree with the opposing view or respond.161 
The commission's order required the gas company to associate with the 
views of others who were chosen on the basis of their viewpoints. 
Therefore, the Court held that the commission's decision must have been 
designed to fulfill a compelling state interest through a regulation of 
"time: place, or manner" and that the order must have been narrowly 
tailored to fulfill the interest.162 These cases, as well as many others, 
support the contention that governmental compulsion of speech is 
antithetical to the First Amendment.163 
C. Given these two elemental principles of our First Amendment 
jurisprudence, it is incongruous to suggest that forcing fruit-growers to 
contribute to a collective advertising campaign does not even involve 
speech, while at the same time effectively conceding that forbidding a 
fruit-grower from making those same contributions voluntarily would 
violate the First Amendment. . . . Yet, that ~precisely what the majority 
opinion does.164 
156 Id. at 5-6. 
157 See id. at 6. 
158 See id. at 7. 
159 See id. at 8. 
160 Seeid.at14-17. 
161 See id. at 15-16. 
162 Id. at 20-21. 
163 See, e.g., Abood u. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 234 (1977) (holding that 
compulsion of speech "works no less an infringement of . . . constitutional rights" than 
prohibition of political contributions); PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 
(1980) (holding that compelling the use of private property for the distribution of leaflets 
violates the First Amendment). 
164 Glickman, 521 U.S. at 505 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
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Justice Thomas's constitutional interpretation is simple: look to the 
text and then, only if it is not clear, look to the Framers.1ss In his speech 
at the University of Kansas, he said, "[W]hen interpreting the 
Constitution, judges should seek the original understanding of the 
provision's text, if that text's meaning· is not readily apparent."166 The 
text of the First Amendment states: "Congress shall make no law 
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise 
thereof; pr abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right 
of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for 
a redress of grievances."167 The amendment does not specifically include 
or exclude commercial speech. Yet, the Court has traditionally 
maintained that commercial speech either has had no protection or only 
limited protection. From Justice Thomas's opinions, it is apparent that 
he believes the Court in Virginia Pharmacy was accurate in its 
determination of how the First Amendment should apply to commercial 
speech. 1GB 
Virginia Pharmacy was a suit brought by Virginia consumers who 
challenged a law making it illegal for licensed pharmacists to advertise 
the prices of prescription drugs.169 In that case, the Court addressed 
several concerns about applying the First Amendment to commercial 
speech. The Court held that commercial speech was protected by the 
First Amendment and that it could not lose that protection simply 
because it is in paid advertising; in a form sold for profit (like a 
magazine); or in a solicitation. 170 In fact, the Court specifically stated 
that "[i]f there is a kind of speech that lacks all First Amendment 
protection, ... it must be distinguished by its content. Yet the speech 
whose content deprives it of protection cannot simply be speech on a 
commercial subject."171 
Commercial speech, like all speech, may lose some of its First 
Amendment protection in certain ways. The Court defined those ways by 
1ss See Thomas, supra note 1, at 6. 
166 ld. 
167 U .S. CONST. amend. l. 
166 See generally Glickman, 521 U.S. at 504-06 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (disagreeing 
with the majority giving discounted weight to commercial speech); Rubin v. Coors Brewing 
Co., 514 U .S. 476, 481-82 (1995) (recognizing that Virginia Pharmacy repudiated earlier 
beliefs that commercial speech deserved no protection); 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode 
Island, 517 U.S. 484, 518-23 (1996) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment) (using the holding in Virginia Pharmacy to show how courts "can no more 
justify regulation of 'commercial' speech than it can justify regulation of 'non-<:ommercial' 
speech."). 
169 Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 
748 (1976). 
170 See id. at 761. 
171 ld. 
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stating, first, that there may be regulations placed upon commercial 
speech that restrict the time, manner, and place of the speech.t72 The 
Court had previously allowed for these restrictions only under certain 
provisions. 173 Namely, the restrictions must not be content based, they 
must serve a significant governmental interest, and they must leave 
alternative means for communication.l74 
Second, regulations, affecting not only commercial speech but also 
all other types of speech, may be used to suppress false or misleading 
statements.t75 The Court, citing earlier cases, noted that "[u]ntruthful 
speech, commercial or otherwise, has never been protected for its own 
sake."l76 The Court even allowed for regulations that curtail the use of 
deceptive, though not completely false, advertising. 177 These regulations, 
according to the Court, could take the form of requiring disclaimers and 
warnings "as are necessary to prevent its being deceptive."l7S The Court 
relied on the fact that the truthfulness of commercial speech is very 
easily verified and controlled since deceptive advertising would 
ultimately have a very chilling effect on profits.'79 
Finally, the Court acknowledged that a State has the authority to 
control and suppress speech that is illegal or that deals with illegal 
activity, whether it is commercially based or not.tso Justice Stewart, in 
his concurring opinion, stated, "There is ... little need to sanction 'some 
falsehood in order to protect speech that matters."'1B1 Indeed, the 
Supreme Court has recognized that the only difference between 
commercial speech and noncommercial speech is that commercial speech 
is based on factual representations and therefore does not operate with 
the ideological freedom that is found in non-commercial speech.182 So, 
where the falsity of non-commercial speech is tempered through the give 
and take of ideas, commercial speech has a heightened responsibility to 
provide truthful, non-misleading information.tsa 
The Court in Virginia Pharmacy concluded by holding that a State 
could not suppress "concededly truthful information about entirely 
172 See id. at 771. 
173 See id. 
174 See id. 
175 See id. 
176 Id. at 771 (citing Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974); 
Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36, 49 (1961)). 
177 See id. at 771-72. 
178 Id. at 772. 
179 See id. at 772 n.24. 
180 See id. at 772. 
181 Id. at 777-78 (Stewart, J., concurring) (quoting Gertz, 418 U.S. at 341). 
182 See id. at 778 (Stewart, J., concurring). 
183 See id. 
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lawful activity .... "184 The fear that the information will negatively 
impact the speakers or the consumers or recipients does not justify the 
deprivation of this fundamental right of self-expression.185 While the 
Court allowed for regulation of commercial speech because, as Justice 
Stewart put it, "Commercial price and product advertising differs 
markedly from ideological expression .... "186 Those exceptions applied 
only to untruthful, misleading, deceptive and/or illegal 
communications.l87 
In Glickman,t88 however, the Court addressed speech that fell into 
none of the excepted categories. The commercials were truthful, generic 
advertisements not designed to deceive or mislead.l89 There was no 
indication that non-participation by fruit growers would lead to 
deceptive advertisements or that consumers would be misled by specific, 
non-generic advertisements by growers who believe that their fruit is 
the best. Yet, the government still sought to regulate the dissemination 
of commercial speech about the virtues of fruit. By stating that this 
regulation does not implicate speech, the Court allowed Congress' power 
to regulate the agricultural industry to preempt First Amendment 
protections. 
D. What we are now left with, if we are to take the majority opinion at face 
value, is one of two disturbing consequences: Either (1) paying for 
advertising is not speech at all, while such activities as draft card 
burning, flag burning, armband wearing, public sleeping and nude 
dancing are, or (2) compelling payment for third party communication 
does not implicate speech, and thus the Government would be free to 
force payment for a whole variety of expressive conduct that it could not 
restrict. In either case, surely we have lost our way. 190 
It seems absurd that in an age where the activities Justice Thomas 
describes are all considered protected "speech" under the First 
Amendment, the Court would say that coerced payment for advertising 
is not speech.l91 As Justice Thomas said, "We as a nation adopted a 
written Constitution precisely because it has a fixed meaning that does 
184 Id. at 773. 
185 See id. 
186 Id. at 778 (Stewart, J., concurring). 
187 See id. at 773. 
188 521 U.S. at 477-482 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
189 See id. 
190 !d. at 506 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
191 See id. at 506 n.4 (citing Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989); Clark v. 
Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288 (1984); Schad v. Borough of Mount 
Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61 (1981); Tinker v. Des Moines lndep. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969); 
United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968)). 
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not change."192 Simply because Congress enacted regulations for decades 
that control the agricultural market does not mean that its use of power 
gives it the ability to undermine the clear written expression of the 
Constitution and its amendments. In Glickman, the regulations do not 
serve compelling state interests nor are they designed to protect citizens 
from the abuse of the right to freedom of expression. To stop short of 
recognizing the speech implicated in this case is to deny the protection 
afforded by the First Amendment. As Thomas recognized, the Court, 
loyal to a balancing test that it adopted and blind to its implications, has 
"surely lost [its] way."l93 
192 Thomas, supra note ·1, at 7. 
193 Glickman, 521 U.S. at 506. 
